Since the early 1990s, the process known as the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), has guided the U.S. military and the Department of Defense (DoD) in deciding what to buy, what their base strategies will be, and which units to form, demobilize, and keep. The QDR process is composed of a vast series of studies, meetings, and reports, and takes more than a year to produce the final report. No document regularly produced in government is so wide-ranging in its scope, nor so controversial.

The current QDR effort is all that and more, reflecting the intent of the administration of President Barack Obama to do more than just downsize or add to the structure of DoD. Instead, the administration has stated an intent to remake the American military in the most sweeping reform since World War II. However, there has been unusually tight security surrounding the current QDR effort, and little is known about what kinds of studies and assumptions are holding sway as the effort heads into its final phases. To find out what working on a QDR effort is like for a senior combatant commander, we sat down with one of America’s most respected soldiers, Gen. Bryan D. “Doug” Brown, USA (Ret.).

Brown entered the Army as a private, and eventually rose to the rank of general. The first Army aviator to do so, he was a founding member of the elite 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (SOAR – the “Night Stalkers”), later its commander, and capped his career as commander of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM). One of the most accomplished special operations professionals America has ever produced, he has a number of useful insights about the QDR process.

The Year in Defense – Can you please provide some background on the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), its origins, and the enabling legislation that provides the mandate for it to be conducted?

Gen. Bryan D. Brown – The QDR is congressionally mandated in Title 10 of the U.S. Code, and provides the opportunity to assess what changes are necessary in DoD to meet immediate threats and ensure we are posturing for the future. It is also an opportunity to grow our capabilities, and eliminate or curtail those that aren’t as immediately required. It translates the National Military Strategy into actual fielded forces. Additionally it can have key issues analyzed for future force structure decisions. While there are those that don’t care for the process, as the commander of SOCOM at a key time in this war, it served us very well.

Both as a U.S. Army major command (MACOM) commander at U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) and combatant command (COCOM) commander at SOCOM, you made significant inputs into multiple QDRs. In those jobs, what kinds of studies did you and your staffs make, and what kinds of products did you deliver to the QDR team at the DoD?

The QDR that was most important in my experience was the 2006 QDR while I was in command of U.S. Special Operations Command. The demonstrated value of the capabilities that Special Operations Forces [SOF] brought to the fight following 9/11 was at the forefront of our efforts against the Taliban and al Qaeda, and that drove a desire to grow SOF, and there was pressure to grow it quickly. I made the decision to grow our schools first. It was not a popular decision, but without the appropriate growth in our ability to assess, select and train, I felt we that we would see a significant decrease in the quality of the U.S. SOF force. Remembering that people are the key to success, I chose to put money into the facilities and personnel at our schoolhouses to allow SOF to grow the “right” people, not to simply get bigger.

As far as studies go, we commissioned a contract study with the simple question of, “If force structure was not an issue, where should SOF be around the world and in what numbers.” At the same time, I formed a military team to answer the same question. The military team was headed by one of the finest officers I have ever had the opportunity to work with – now-Brig. Gen. Craig Nixon, USA [a former commander of the 75th Ranger Regiment]. The work by the military team was exceptional and really established a baseline of where SOF unit and personnel strength should be working in the years ahead. Once we had the answer to the first part, we added the enablers to support the force and that provided a “strawman” of where we needed to go.

We then formed a QDR team, which built the plan and developed a “playbook.” It was detailed. We knew the force structure, the program costs and the timeline for every new unit or capability in our plan. The entire plan came together when we put my then-deputy, Adm. Eric Olson, USN, in Washington, D.C., almost full time, to lead our team. He was tremendous, and in my opinion our methodology and attention to detail brought us great success. To name just a few areas of success, we grew our Army Special Forces operators that were vital to our operations in OEF and OIF. We also grew the U.S. Navy SEALS, and the Army’s 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment.

Air Force Special Operations Command [AFSOC] made the greatest transformation as we added to the Foreign Internal Defense [FID]Squadron, bought additional manned Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance [ISR] platforms, added an MQ-1 Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle [UAV] Wing to work for SOCOM, and a fleet of non-standard aircraft for the various theater-level SOF component commands. I am told that many of these SOCOM initiatives are now in the field, and doing well. I cannot say enough about the sacrifice of the QDR team that lived in D.C. for months to ensure success in the QDR. They worked tirelessly. One last thing we developed was an online “dashboard” as we began fielding these new units and capabilities, so that the leadership could go online every day and follow the growth and immediately identify those areas where there were problems.

Was this trend to transform and enlarge the SOF schoolhouses first something that has been mirrored by the conventional forces when they grow, or unique to SOCOM?

I think it is partly a matter of scale, because if the conventional forces were to grow by some really big numbers, they would have to enlarge their training centers. They could expand their forces a little without having to significantly grow their schools; we in SOCOM could not. Frankly the percentage of growth in special operations was so dramatic, fully one-third in active-duty Army Special Forces (SF) groups (SFGs) for example, that there was no way we could have grown SOF end strength without ensuring the building/enlarging of the schoolhouses first and adding to our training capacity/throughput. By comparison, the recent percentage growth authorized for the U.S. Army is in the low single digits, about 22,000 out of 500,000. We simply could not do that in the special operations community.

You have to remember that when I was the U.S. Army Special Operations Command commander, we were well short of SF “A-Teams” and SF non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and it seemed to me that it was very difficult to get any initiative going to grow the force and fill those empty SF manpower slots. In fact, at one point I was told to take those slots and move them somewhere else that we needed, but I did not do that. I felt then and now that the SF groups are the heart and soul of USASOC. We tried some things down at the JFK Special Warfare Center and School [JFKSWCS], but we did not grow very fast.

I will tell you that once I was the SOCOM commander and Maj. Gen. Jim Parker, USA, went into the JFKSWCS, his work down there at Fort Bragg, N.C., was magnificent. He reorganized the entire structure of the school, streamlined the way that we recruit and train SF NCOs, and maintained the standards of quality and excellence of that community. I did not originally think we could grow the SF community as quickly and keep that quality the way Jim Parker reorganized it. I think that Jim Parker did it all! Now, I think it needs to be said that what he did had a large dose of common sense, by identifying the bottlenecks and streamlining the processes of the SF Q-Course. For example, we used to recruit and assess SF soldiers, and then put them through this incredible course, but then if they failed the foreign language course, [they] were eliminated. What Jim Parker did was to start teaching language from the beginning of the course, so the students can be assessed much earlier, and not waste their time or the Army’s. He really remapped the entire program. We also resourced the JFKSWCS much better than we had previously, which helped Jim and his people power through to success.

In your experience, what influence do QDRs normally have on the overall structure, acquisitions, and doctrine of the forces within DoD?

The QDR has huge implications in every area. It builds structure, focuses acquisition and supports doctrine. It can also drive ad hoc units of convenience into real TO&E units. Again, there are many naysayers, but my experience is that it forces decisions and actions. I did not always agree with every decision, but at the end of the day, I felt we had a chance to make our case.

How influential is a QDR final report across the spectrum of the U.S. government, into places like the departments of State and Homeland Security, and of course the Congress?

I think that the final QDR report, when it eventually comes out, is going to be a pretty influential and important document. Leading up to the QDR report that is coming out soon, you can see all of the press reports and discussions regarding the road map for where DoD is going in the future. This has big implications throughout Washington, D.C., the Congress, and, of course, DoD. We’re into a period where we are trying to “balance the force,” and right now we’re building more capability to help train foreign forces, humanitarian efforts, and foreign internal defense-type missions.

That is a very important message to the folks over at the State Department, who find those kinds of efforts very attractive in their overall strategy. That DoD is going to be more engaged in helping nations defend themselves rather than only preparing for is a major war is an issue of great interest to them. I have no doubt that how we equip the National Guard and what kinds of formations we build for them will have a big impact on their capabilities and missions, something that the Department of Homeland Security has a definite interest in.

Given your experience with the QDR process, does it take several QDR cycles to justify the requirement to grow or build new units, capabilities, and weapons systems? Or can a driving situation like an ongoing conflict or crisis mandate a single QDR cycle for such growth and acquisitions?

Well, I think you have to break that into two separate pieces. One is what I would call “normal” or “peacetime” activities. These take a lot longer. The second, when you get into significant combat operations like those in Afghanistan and Iraq and the needs are more obvious, there the system tends to move a little faster. And even then it can take a long time. Now if you want to create something like a small SOF unit under SOCOM’s Title 10 authority to train, organize, equip, and it does not need a lot of resources, you can do that rather quickly. But if you want to stand up a new MH-47 Chinook battalion, then that is going to take a lot longer, often over two QDR cycles. Really I think it is a matter of priorities and necessities. I think it is pretty clear when you go into the “battle labs” of Iraq and Afghanistan where your shortcomings are, and you need to fill those in quickly. That makes the process move along faster.

When you were commanding USASOC and SOCOM, you headed a significant effort to expand Special Operations Force end strength and units following September 11. How did that process begin, and what were the significant milestones do you recall along the way?

As I mentioned first we [SOCOM] grew the schools. Then we aggressively recruited new SOF professionals. Of course there were timing issues with parent service processes and trying to grow the force, ensuring they were fielded with service common equipment, then ramping up the SOF purchases for the SOF unique equipment items. It was tough, and even tougher in the Reserve component units. Both took time. Additionally, all the services have very refined force-structuring processes, and forcing change quickly in a process that is that well-defined and regulated is difficult. And of course, military construction is always lagging, especially when you need new SOF or mission-specific facilities like simulator or maintenance centers. You can grow the forces much more rapidly than you can build world-class facilities and so at times the troops end up in sub-standard facilities. When I saw the numbers of 18s [SF soldiers all have 18-series MOS numbers], the Special Forces NCOs, start to grow after a long period of declining numbers, I knew we had a successful process. They had been traditionally very difficult to add to the ranks.

You obviously have enjoyed a high level of success in justifying the need for new SOF force structure during your tenure at USASOC and SOCOM. Based upon your own experience, once a new unit or units are authorized, what is the process of standing them up, and what sort of training and other infrastructure is needed?

The detailed work of building the unit’s requirements correctly, working through the DoD system, and then recruiting, assessing and selecting is very, very difficult. Additionally it takes years to acquire equipment, so starting from scratch to bring an unplanned unit into the ranks drives a lot of changes and priorities at the parent service level. We were lucky to get the great support we did. Training infrastructure is always a difficulty. For example, the U.S. Navy SEALS on the West Coast have been a specific problem when it comes to close-in training facilities. Any location where you have to share ranges with a much larger conventional force, like Fort Bragg [the home station for the 82nd Airborne Division and XVIII Airborne Corps], makes training facilities a problem.

In addition, the DoD processes are not built for rapidly fielding new units. It takes lots of hard work and continuing detailed planning. Think of it like this: first you need to find the soldier and get him trained, then every soldier in a new unit needs all his equipment, and nothing was in an existing program (we don’t build great warehouses of equipment just in case we decide to build new units). Then he needs SOF-unique equipment, again unprogrammed. He also needs a place to live and work, ranges and facilities to train, along with all the expendable training resources such as the right amount of ammunition, rations, and other things that go with training. It goes on and on … And, as I said earlier, it takes detailed planning, hard work, and dedicated people and cooperation.

You were a founding member of one of the most unique SOF units in the world, the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, the “Night Stalkers.” For the personnel who are given the mission of standing up new formations, what are the special challenges and rewards of being a “plankowner” for such a unit?

I could write a book about standing up the 160th. It grew from necessity. My advice would be, again, that the DoD processes won’t support rapid and unique unit growth well, and you have to power through the system. The good news for us was the units to build the 160th SOAR were already in being in the form of the 158th and 229th Aviation Battalions in the 101st Airborne Division [Air Assault]; it was just the mission that changed. You then have got to pick the right people to help stand it up. The type of work we were doing at that time – which was developing the TTPs [tactics, techniques, and procedures] to fly with primitive NVGs – was not for everyone, and we had some people leave. There is never a more important time for strong leadership. People in the ranks are always important, but those that carry the load to do the detailed staff work to power through the system when a unit is standing up are real heroes. And if you have an advocate at the highest levels it helps.

We had a mandate because of the failure of Operation Eagle Claw at Desert One in 1980, so standing up the Night Stalkers was probably easier than some other examples, although its growth until the 2006 QDR and the wars following 9/11 had been difficult. Of course with any new capability, there are parochial interests and people at all levels that will try to put impediments in your way. That certainly happened with the 160th SOAR, but the need was too great, and their capability was too unique to be stopped.

In your experience, does the standing up of new units with different capabilities from those already in existence mandate a “zero sum gain” of demobilizing existing units?

No. … Again it takes great study and hard decisions, but we need a balanced force. There is always an edict of no growth in the top line, but there was a reason we built the unit that is being deactivated in the first place, and it is difficult for me to see any unit being unnecessary that quickly. Such action should not mandated by a policy that is based on resources instead of requirements. The environment changes daily, and so do the requirements. Rules that don’t allow flexibility in the structuring of a force are not helpful. I often think I see “kiddy soccer” in DoD today as everyone chases the hot topic of the day. For instance, today it is the Irregular Warfare ball that everyone is chasing down the field. In the end, it will be a balanced force across all the full spectrum of conflict that will best defend the USA.

Is there a core theme or line of thought that appears to be guiding the present QDR effort? And do you have any sense of the contributions of simulations, wargames, and other assessment tools being used to support the QDR effort?

I have not been briefed or participated in today’s QDR, but from what I have heard and read, it seems to be on the right track. I think for special operations there will continue to be growth in the right areas. One of Secretary [of Defense Robert] Gates’ main themes will be to institutionalize capabilities like counterterrorism and foreign internal defense. Those are designated in the Nunn-Cohen Amendment that built SOCOM as “SOF activities.” So I think again that this direction will be good for SOCOM and SOF, and good for building the type of forces that are needed for a whole-of-government approach to warfighting. Additionally, this will be an opportunity to fix anything that we failed to get correct in 2006, which could include more enabling forces.

I think that true to the mandate of the QDR, you will see changes to meet today’s threat and balance the force for the future. Simulations and wargaming are critical to any force structuring effort. When properly applied, the ability to fight out a scenario, even if only in simulation, will cause the decision makers to react, and when they do so it will expose gaps in capability for examination. While analysis and wargaming can be overdone, it is critical to finding the right balance in forces for the future. Today we are involved in two wars and a global struggle again violent extremism. The requirements are pretty clear. But looking to future adversaries and the requirement to defend America in a future environment is not nearly as obvious, and that is where wargaming and simulation efforts are so valuable.

Given your own experience and thoughts, what are some of the key issues you hope would be examined by DoD in the present QDR effort?

I think that the things I would put up on the wall would be these:

SOF Growth: I think that we want to continue the appropriate growth of the U.S. SOF community. Bigger does not always mean better, so we have to make sure that what the SOF community goes into the QDR to ask for are not “random acts of growth.” It needs to be absolutely studied and designed to meet the requirements that we think we are going to have in front of us in the immediate future. So I think that SOF needs to grow some more, but I would be careful about continuing to add really big numbers of personnel and units to SOCOM.

Conventional Ground Forces Growth: In between the 2006 and present QDRs, you have seen the growth in end-strength of both the Army and Marine Corps, and that is one of the things that I think needs to be studied very carefully. Do we still need to grow more in those services? Everybody acknowledges the tremendous cost of growing ground forces, but quite frankly the operations tempo and personnel tempo on our deployed personnel over the past eight years since 9/11 has been absolutely extreme. If it takes a larger Army and Marine Corps to maintain the level of presence that we are going to need around the world in this persistent conflict, then we need to get it right. I am certain that the CSA [chief of staff of the Army] and the CMC [commandant of the Marine Corps] work this issue every day.

Procurement/Modernization: As far as “big ticket” procurement and modernization items, this is a bit of a troublesome area for me in discussion about the present QDR. Some people think that the words, “balancing the force,” mean we’re going to get rid of all of our capability to go into a major regional contingency, and “balance” to the light or SOF side of force structure. I don’t see it that way. I think that what we need to do is take the analysis, and make sure that the force can do all the things the country reasonably can expect of its Department of Defense, and number one is to defend the nation.

If you will allow me, the full range of capabilities to deal with the full spectrum of threats and possibilities?

Right, and the force has to be balanced to do that. And there are some systems and capabilities that are expensive and that you may not be using every day, but that you have to have when the time comes, and there is no replacement for them. So I don’t want to see us go totally away from forces that allow us to fight the MRCs, to units that only fight in small wars. The point is to get a real balance. There are a large part of our forces in the middle of the spectrum that can play in both kinds of wars, like the 10th Mountain Division up at Fort Drum, N.Y. It does not matter what kind of contingency you have; the 10th Mountain or the 82nd Airborne are going to be deployed there. We have learned again the importance of ground forces, and we need to get the balance between the air, maritime, and heavy, light, and SOF correct. But I see in the press a lot of discussion, some of which would make you believe that “balancing the force” means giving up our heavy forces and moving to small units consisting only of “light” forces, and that is not what I am talking about. “Balance” is across the full spectrum of conflict! Now, some of these types of equipment are very expensive, and this is why it is critical that we get the acquisition numbers right. We don’t need a lot of extra stuff sitting on the shelf with the American taxpayers footing the bill for it.

So the lessons of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz still apply, as do the need to fulfill core missions like air supremacy, sea control, and superiority at the point of attack?

Absolutely! But I think Gen. Peter Schoomaker, USA [the 35th chief of staff of the Army], was right when he said, “The preponderance of future wars will be more like Sun Tzu than Clausewitz.”

Based upon your own extensive experience in the areas of unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency operations, and expeditionary warfare, what do you see as the short-term trends in training, organization, and equipping for ground units heading into America’s present contingency operations (Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.) overseas?

First I would say that the services, and specifically the Army and the Marines, have made a major course change in the methods they use to train for the Afghanistan and Iraqi battlefields. The emphasis on small-unit tactics and the impressive efforts at the Combat Training Centers [like Fort Irwin, Calif., and Fort Polk, La.) to replicate and problem-play the scenarios that soldiers and Marines will be facing is incredible and undoubtedly has made us more successful. And we cannot forget the Air Force and Navy, that perform their traditional roles but have also taken on some dangerous ground missions and done them very well. After all, the key to warfare is the people that are trained, equipped, and empowered to fight it. … In this type of warfare, it is even more important that every individual understands the importance of when to pull a trigger, not just to pull the trigger.

Do you feel the existing processes of review (QDR, etc.) provide an appropriate level of MACOM and COCOM input into the development of ground forces within DoD?

On the equipment side I have seen the vice chief of staff of the Army [VCSA-Gen. Peter Chiarelli] and the assistant commandant of the Marine Corps [ACMC – Gen. James Amos, USMC] testify for lightweight equipment. This is key. The terrain in Afghanistan, specifically on the Afghanistan/Pakistan border, is the toughest on earth. We need to give our soldiers their best chance for success, and that means that they must be incredibly physically fit, and their equipment must be right. Everything from their armaments to their body armor to the types and amounts of ammunition they carry has to be evaluated. You absolutely cannot send soldiers into combat when they are burdened to the point they cannot move. It is obvious to me that the VCSA and the ACMC get it. I am sure the same message is coming from the combatant commanders and the troops, so I am certain the QDR team at DoD will pay attention. It is important.

We’ve obviously seen an incredible array of achievements by the U.S. SOF community since the September 11 attacks. How do you see these kinds of forces and operations contributing to long-range resolutions of existing contingency operations around the world, and are there enough SOF units to meet the needs of regional COCOMs?

On the SOF question, as I have visited battlefields across the world, I was completely impressed by the SOF tactics, techniques, and procedures, as well as the equipment that started in SOF but quickly migrated to the conventional forces when the young officers and NCOs saw the task at hand. They understood the missions, and what it took to perform them. And often the SOF forces had the skills, and were more than willing to partner and share.

There were occasions where we saw some mid- to higher-level leaders that didn’t understand the roles and capabilities of SOF, and would attempt to take control of the SOF units in the area. In one case, a conventional force officer actually tried to break an A-Team into one-man elements to ride along in Bradley fighting vehicles! These incidents were more prevalent in the beginning of the war, and as the forces have worked closer together, a trust and understanding has been built that maximized the effects of both forces, as well as the indigenous security forces.

Lastly, I’d say that this is the type of warfare that SOF was designed to fight. People that are hand-picked, highly trained in problem-solving, and out-of-the-box thinking, understand the value of language and culture are critical in this kind of war. Early on, as SOCOM was tasked to write the plan for what was then called the Global War on Terror, we made it clear that the key to success was the indirect piece and not all direct action. That was a hard sell then, but today it is well understood, and as you hear and see the discussions of smart power, I would say that it has great support throughout the government.

Can you talk a little about the “smart power” concept please?

Well, “smart power” – the words were coined by Joseph Nye, Jr. up at Harvard University – is all about synchronizing action by all elements of a government overseas. It takes “hard power,” which are the forces and capabilities that DoD has and is good at using, and combines it with “soft power,” which includes all the diplomacy pieces like working with foreign nations to improve their infrastructure, medical capabilities, governance, and such – all those kinds of things that would traditionally be done by other government agencies like the State Department, USAID, and the U.S. Information Agency if it were still properly funded. You put those two things together, and use them in the appropriate mix, and you get smart power. You want to use the DoD where it is appropriate, and use all the other elements of government where they are appropriate. With that, you get smart power.

I think that SOCOM’s Global War on Terror plan was a microcosm of that. SOF is known for being able to do the indirect [soft power]portion, changing the environment where enemy works and lives, as well as the direct [hard power] portion where the impact on the enemy is more “kinetic” – things like training our partner nations to be better able to defend their borders, and assistance in the information operations realm. My point is that SOCOM wrote the DoD Global War on Terror plan, and it matches up well with the smart-power construct we have been talking about. It is about eliminating all the things in an environment that allow your enemy to work. SOCOM has the tools that can work to assist that effort across the board, like our civil affairs personnel which are critical, and psychological operations forces that are so good at the information piece of the equation.

If you look at what the Navy did during the tsunami relief effort in 2004 and 2005, that is possibly the best example of smart power I can think of in modern history. Think about it. We went in there with all those great Navy helicopters and what are traditionally called “warships” on a humanitarian mission that saved thousands of lives. But just as importantly, the people’s opinion in that area of Asia of the United States, its value systems, and what this nation all about changed dramatically once they saw us come in. Now you cannot wait around for a natural disaster to happen around the world to give you an opportunity to conduct a smart power operation. But there are things that we can do, with the capabilities that we already have, like the regional cruises of the hospital ships Comfort and Mercy. There has to be sustainability to it. We conduct medical capability [MEDCAP] engagements and port calls all over the world, but they traditionally are just a few weeks long, what I used to call “random acts of engagement.” These efforts need to become more sustainable by DoD partnering with other parts of government.

Given your career experience, can you give us any sort of insight into the kinds and mix of ground forces you see emerging into the U.S. military in the next several decades?

First let me say that all our formations, from every service and from every area in every service, are magnificent. Each brings their own form of excellence to the battlefield. Obviously there will be a growth of more SOF units, but additionally I would think you will see the continued growth of the conventional force. Again we have relearned the importance of boots on the ground, and the importance of light- and mountain-capable forces. The type of terrain and the mission in Afghanistan lends itself to presence, and that means boots on the ground. And that means soldiers and Marines.

We can never discount the importance of being ready for every threat, so there will always be a need for our heavy forces that have served so well in our current fight as well. The Third Infantry Division’s “Thunder Run” into Baghdad at the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom [OIF] will continue to be one of the great events of these wars. Hopefully we will see a growth across the services in those enablers that are critical to any fight. Army aviation is one that is extremely high demand. We also need additional military police, intelligence units, and dog teams, just to name a few. The services have taken this on already and are transforming units every day, but in the end, during a time of persistent conflict and small wars, these forces are critical.

Do you see the present focus on existing contingency operations driving decisions like the recent cancellation of the Army’s Future Combat System, and the current reconsideration of the Marine Corps Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle?

I see the attempt to balance the force and meeting today’s threat while keeping an eye on what is needed in the future to enable the soldier driving most present-day acquisition decisions. The difficulty is defining what is the correct balance. The current wars have shown us a shortfall in boots on the ground, along with a critical shortfall in people with the right linguistic and cultural capabilities. Security forces provide a key to any counter-insurgency fight, and we were immediately short military police early in OIF. Soon, thanks to some great work by the Army, there were trained field artillery soldiers and others doing the dangerous but critical job of guarding convoys and protecting installations. That is just one of hundreds of examples of flexibility and speed in the way the services reacted to emerging requirements.

Given the obvious growth in capability offered by legacy unmanned systems like the MQ-1 Predator, what kinds of unmanned systems do you see being introduced into future forces?

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated the requirement for the right information being delivered at the very lowest level of command. Many of our successes against al Qaeda are due to accurate and timely intelligence, and a good portion of that can be attributed to the phenomenal success of unmanned systems. The MQ-1 Predator is of course the system that comes to mind, but there is a wide assortment of Unmanned Aerial Systems [UASs] on the battlefield today, and I think it has changed the way we fight forever.

When we first deployed the Predator, I think it was seen simply as something that was overhead and provided [real-time] pictures. But like all new systems, the leaders on the battlefield figured out how to maximize its capabilities. The SOF forces under Gen. Stan McChrystal probably evolved those capabilities the fastest of anyone after 9/11. As a result, UASs immediately became an integral piece of the intelligence picture and situational awareness environment. We learned a lot, including that the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance [ISR] mission couldn’t be done with one or even a few UAS orbits. Getting the complete ISR picture takes multiple UAS orbits, and the data from those systems needs to be fused with that from manned capabilities like TF Odin [Observe, Detect, Identify, And Neutralize], as well as HUMINT and SIGINT data. I think the future for manned and unmanned reconnaissance systems is great.

How do you see these unmanned aerial systems being assimilated into the so-called “balanced” force that will emerge in the years ahead, especially with the wide variety of UASs that have been procured since September 11?

I think that is the problem, and I was in a fairly lengthy discussion about that very point just a few weeks ago. I think that we need to decide the types and numbers of UAS systems and capabilities we want in the future, and how they are going to be organized. Those ad hoc units that meet a future requirement need to be organized into TO&E units when they return. Today we have a plethora of manned and unmanned systems providing a vital capability in Iraq and Afghanistan. Someday we’re going to be out of Iraq and Afghanistan, and at that point, we’re going to have to catalog and categorize all these systems and build the formations around them so that we ensure that the right UAS will be given the right mission.

Not all of those systems currently on the battlefield are going to play in a major regional contingency. We’ll have plenty of opportunities for UASs, from humanitarian support to strike missions. But in the interim, I believe we will continue to grow our manned and unmanned airborne reconnaissance fleets to support the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as much as we can get over there, because they are crucial to the conduct of this war.

We’ve got to make sure that we’re maximizing everything that we have purchased for the conflicts since 9/11. The so-called supplementals have served us well with new equipment, but not everything should come home. On the technology side, I think that the future for UAVs of all kinds is really bright. The evolution of the UAV from the first day we went into Afghanistan back in 2001 to today is just unbelievable! As I look to the next 10 years, it is going to be even more dramatic.

What kinds of people do you see the Army and Marines needing in the future to fight the kinds of wars you expect America to fight in the decades ahead?

The secret to success is always people, and I am constantly impressed by the people who choose to serve. The No. 1 SOF truth is that, “Humans are more important than hardware.” All the armed services have transformed themselves for this time of persistent conflict, while having to keep in mind the potential for future peer competitors. Tomorrow’s soldier and Marine on the battlefield is going to have to be a problem solver: They have got to be as mature as possible, and they have got to understand the big picture of just why we are doing what we are doing. They [also] have got to understand the importance of [local] culture, and how to win the support of the [indigenous] people. They have to be comfortable training foreign forces, as well as fighting [with] them. Strong, well-trained leadership is required at every level. And all the time our forces have to remain extremely lethal, for defeating a threat will always be the priority. Sounds like today’s [Army] Special Forces soldier … doesn’t it?

Back in 2001, a journalist friend of mine described American soldiers and Marines as the most valuable and most poorly resourced assets in the whole of DoD. Can you take us forward to the present day, and tell us what you think of how well trained and equipped our ground combat personnel are today?

Well, I don’t think we can ever do enough to ensure that every soldier [and Marine] that goes on the battlefield is properly trained and equipped. That is their best chance for success and survival, and I would emphasize the training piece first. I would tell you that we are light-years ahead of the way we resourced ground personnel 20 years ago. If you just look at pictures of an Army or Marine unit walking down the street in Iraq today, you see it. World-class body armor, a 6- or 8-pound radio that he can pick up and talk to an aircraft overhead, or in some cases even turn it into a satellite communications terminal and blast signals all the way back to the States. While I know there is some debate about the M16/M4 and that it may be time for us to move on to a new weapons system, look at the rail system on the front of that and all the things we’ve hung on there to make it more effective. Laser sights, flashlights, and all sorts of things that make it a more effective weapon. Everything that you see that soldier [or Marine] carrying is first class, and better than we have ever had before.

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